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TTIP: THE RISE OF ‘MEGA-MARKET’ TRADE AGREEMENTS AND 
ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
AOIFE O’DONOGHUE & NTINA TZOUVALA† 
                                                          
This article intervenes in the growing academic discussion about the potential 
impact of currently negotiated trade and investment agreements such as the 
TTIP, the CETA, and the TPP. To do so, our contribution focuses on the 
rarely asked question of how these agreements will impact the Global South. 
After showing that there is no stable and clear international legal definition of 
a ‘developing’ state, this contribution argues that the EU already has a 
number of legal obligations towards the Global South (for example, the 
Cotonou Agreement) that need to inform the debate about the objectives and 
potential impact of the TTIP. Further, our argument emanates from the 
position that it was the failure of the Doha Development Round of 
negotiations in the WTO that paved way for what we understand to be a 
‘strategic bilateralism’ of the Global North. The second part of this article 
attempts to evaluate the potential impact of this strategic bilateralism on three 
distinct fields, first, on the relations between the West and emerging peripheral 
powers, such as China or Brazil; second, on the economic stability and 
viability of the Least Developed Countries; and third, on the most 
marginalised and vulnerable sections of the society regardless of their 
nationality. Our tentative conclusion is that given the potential adverse impact 
on all these three fronts, it is essential for the EU to re-evaluate its strategy. 
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† Laureate Fellow in International Law, Melbourne Law School. Email: 
konstantina.tzouvala[at]unimelb.edu.au. 
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Delgado Casteleiro (Max Plank Institute Luxemburg) and Dr. Donatella Alessandrini (Kent 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite its illusive and presently unsettled content, the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) has attracted considerable debate and criticism. 
This article joins the fray, concentrating on what the TTIP, as well as the recently 
concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Canadian-EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), may mean for the Global South. This 
group of trade treaties offer a new form of mega regional treaty that moves far 
beyond World Trade Organization standards in the removal of both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. The TTIP is a mega regional treaty between the EU and the 
US. Reflecting on the potential impact of regional trade and investment 
agreements on the Global South, this article centres itself in the context of an 
international economic legal order where trade, development, and investment are 
intertwined and where the Global North no longer controls global economics to 
the extent necessary to  ignore the rest of the world. 
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This article is structured around four principal themes. First, we critically reflect on 
the premises of our own analysis engaging with the contradictory and elusive 
attempt to define the Global South in international law. Second, we provide a 
background to current negotiations by focusing on three elements; existing trade 
relations between the EU with the Global South, the gradual collapse of the Doha 
(Development) Round and the determination of Global North leaders to push 
forward the expansion of international trade and investment law even in the 
absence of their Global South counterparts. Third, we attempt an analysis of the 
potential impact of these agreements on the Global South distinguishing between 
the Developing Countries (DCs) like China, which are likely to challenge this 
‘strategic bilateralism’ and the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) that are in an 
economically weaker negotiating position. In doing so, the article asks whether in 
ploughing ahead with negotiations without considering their wider impact, the 
Global North and the EU in particular, underestimate the power of the Global 
South now to place obstacles in the way of perceived progress. Our contribution 
also focuses on the LDCs being caught between competing trading camps with 
potentially devastating outcomes to their trade flows alongside attempts by the 
Global South to utilize current international trade structures to their advantage. 
Finally, the article challenges the state-centric outlook of the mainstream debate on 
international trade and economic law. To do so, this contribution elaborates on the 
potential impact of the TPP/TTIP/CETA on the subalterns by focusing on the 
effects of the TTIP on access to medicine and the fruit trade. Given that much of 
the content of these agreements are available only through leaks as their 
negotiations are not publicly accessible, the purpose of this contribution is to 
highlight two potential impacts of negotiation. First, the effect of these agreements 
on actors who remain invisible to international lawyers and second, the attempts of 
the Global North to circumnavigate the growing influence of the Global South on 
the structures of trade agreements and development. By questioning the analytical 
purchase placed on contractualism and sovereign equality, often to the detriment 
of a clear understanding of how international law shapes the world, our analysis 
provides the underlying basis to comprehend the contemporary trend toward 
‘mega-markets’ and their actual effect on the globe. In doing so, the article 
attempts to broaden the scope of inquiry regarding the potential impact of the 
TTIP. The piece moves beyond the formal criterion of contracting parties, 
examining how international economic law has the potential to shape the world in 
ways that surpasses the narrow cycle of parties nominally bound by international 
treaties.  
 
II. DEFINING THE GLOBAL SOUTH THROUGH DEVELOPMENT 
 
The TTIP negotiations are amongst the Global North, indeed amongst two of the 
world’s largest markets with the aim of creating a super or mega-market. This 
fulcrum suggests a conviction that beyond the borders of this supermarket there is 
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little need for concern from either the negotiators or commentators. Yet, it already 
has a global impact. Such impacts include the proportion of the world’s trade 
market the TTIP will encompass, the new global trade treaty standards that it 
(alongside the TPP and the CETA) is setting and the enhancement of the power 
these markets already possess. The form that the TTIP is taking requires 
consideration of how the interests of the Global South are affected, the nature of 
engagement, the manner in which the contestation emerging from the Global 
South is occurring and the effect of these factors on its implementation. Yet, in 
discussing the Global South, it is necessary to emphasize the considerable internal 
differentiations within that nomenclature, in order to decipher accurately the 
capricious implications of the TTIP.  
 
A. (Under) development and the Persistence of Hierarchies in International Law 
 
The multiplicity of standards utilized to describe Developing Countries (DC), 
Least Developed Countries (LDC), Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries, and High 
Income Developing Countries amongst a plethora of other terms, singularly fails 
to capture the multiplicity of interests in and the impact of trade agreements such 
as the TTIP or the TPP on states as diverse as China, Brazil, Angola, Bangladesh 
or the Solomon Islands. Categorizing states on a linear, progressive spectrum of 
economic development is the bedrock of international trade and international 
economic and more generally, development law. Indeed, their intertwining is key in 
understanding the operations of both the Global North and South in negotiation.1 
Whilst the contemporary notion of development centers on economic criteria with 
some geographic input, it also forms part of a much broader understanding of the 
hierarchy between political communities in the eyes of international law. Even 
though the specific terms of categorization have evolved around newer criteria for 
                                               
*Dr. Aoife O’Donoghue (Senior Lecturer, Durham Law School), Dr Ntina Tzouvala 
(Laureate Fellow in International Law, Melbourne Law School).). We would like to warmly 
thank Dr. Sylvia de Mars (Newcastle Law School), Dr. Andrés Delgado Casteleiro (Max 
Plank Institute Luxemburg) and Dr. Donatella Alessandrini (Kent Law School) for their 
comments and insights. Any errors remain our own. This article takes into account events 
up until the end of September 2016. The authors can be contacted at 
aoife.o'donoghue[at]durham.ac.uk and konstantina.tzouvala[at]unimelb.edu.au. 
1 Upendra Baxi, What may the ‘Third World’ expect from International Law?, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE 9 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 2008); See 
also WTO’s Discussion of Developing Countries, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm and EU’s Discussion on 
Relations with Developing Countries, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/developing-countries/index_en.htm. 
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classification, they still largely focus on the same group of non-Western states.2 As 
Pahuja has argued, the concept of ‘development’ decisively entered the vocabulary 
of international law in the aftermath of the World War Two, when overt 
imperialism and biological racism were no longer acceptable bases for establishing 
hierarchy in the international realm.3 Instead, ‘development’ was anchored to the 
supposedly neutral, scientific language of economic measurements, and more 
specifically to the Gross National Product (GNP).4 As a result of this discursive 
shift, the Global North, this time led by the US, maintained its hegemonic position 
in the international sphere.5 Further, ‘development’ provided ideological support 
for international law and institutions, since it became a new, allegedly universally 
shared aspiration and a bridge to reconcile the tension between formal sovereignty 
and persistent hierarchy.  
 
Nonetheless, ‘development’ turned out to be a complicated and contradictory 
concept. The fact that the leaders of the developing states eventually embraced it 
and attempted to use it, in order to challenge this very hierarchy, adds additional 
complexity to the employment of the term. As Lamp has argued:  
‘While the lineage of the concept of ‘development’ may be Western, the ‘less-
developed’ countries appropriated the concept in the context of establishment of 
the multilateral trading system. These countries deployed it as a counterweight to 
the US narrative about the purpose of the trading system, namely to lift 
international economic relations out of the state of nature, release world trade 
from public and private restrictions and provide a forum for reciprocal 
liberalisation.’6  
 
                                               
2  WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 205-220 (Howard 
University Press 1974) [hereinafter RODNEY]. 
3 SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 63 (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
[hereinafter PAHUJA] ( “[T]he promise of the developmentalism nascent in Truman’s point 
four overcame the post-Holocaust unease at maintaining divisions based overtly on race or 
civilisational status.”). 
4 Id. at 93 (“Through its securing via the quantiﬁable, and therefore putatively scientiﬁc, 
measure of GNP, development offered a way to maintain both the putative objectivity of 
the key concepts of international law and a hierarchy of states but, crucially, it did so 
without resorting to the now uncomfortable ideas of race or civilisational superiority.”).   
5 Id. at 48-9 (“Thus ‘Europe’ was replaced by the ‘developed’ world, which could both 
maintain a putative universality for its knowledge and mediate the antinomy between the 
new formal sovereign equality and the maintenance of hierarchy.”).   
6  Nicolas Lamp, The ‘Development’ Discourse in International Trade Law Making 8 (Queen’s 
University Research Paper Series, Paper No. 057, May 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608198. [hereinafter LAMP]. 
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The most characteristic instance of this attempted appropriation was the effort of 
the then Third World to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
in the course of the 1970s. 7  The aim of the NIEO was to restructure the 
international economic order using the post decolonization numeric strength of 
the Global South.8 Whilst the NIEO arguably failed to appropriate or radically 
alter international economic law, its contemporary resonance ought not to be 
underestimated. Both the global diffusion of economic power as well as the 
current state of global trade negotiations suggest that at least some of the NIEO’s 
historic tactics, for instance, the reliance on using the Global South’s numerical 
majority in the UN General Assembly or consistent contestation of the 
assumptions made within economic policies, may be glimpsed again in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).9 
 
The potentially positive nature of an unsettled legal definition of the Global South 
or development ought to be taken seriously. It might be positive in the sense that 
law has not, as it often does, occupied and calcified a particular definition. 
Potentially, the multiplicity of classifications enables a contested miasma to 
function around the conception of what is ‘developing.’ Milan Bulajić argues that 
‘as in every other system of law, it would be necessary from the point of view of 
classical law,  to determine the subjects of international development law; yet the 
variation has not caused law to cease functioning.’ 10  In the context of trade 
negotiations, the institution of strict legal definitions may militate against the 
flexibility that it grants to some in the Global South; for both self-designation and 
                                               
7  See generally MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER (UNESCO/Holmes & Meier 1979). The three most significant moments for the 
construction of NIEO were three UNGA Resolutions largely voted for by the Third World 
and the Socialist Block, while Western states either abstained or voted against: The three 
more significant being: Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974); 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/S-6/3202 (May 1, 1974) and the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/Res/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 
1974). 
8  S Chatterjee, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New International 
Economic Order, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 669 (1991). 
9 Philip S Golub, From the New International Economic Order to the G20: how the ‘global South’ is 
restructuring world capitalism from within, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 1000-1015 (2013). 
10  MILAN BULAJIĆ, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW 66 
(Nijhoff1993). 
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insistence on a negotiating presence.11 The value of such flexibility is recognized in 
the Global North. For example, the EU defines certain regions as areas requiring 
structural and investment fund assistance, claiming its own internal system of 
special treatment for lesser developed areas.12  
 
B. The Fluid Content of ‘Development’ and its Implications for International Economic Law  
 
To appreciate both the impact of the TTIP and the context which has moved trade 
negotiations away from within the multilateral fora, it is important to consider how 
international trade law differentiates itself amongst the Global South. International 
trade law in the form of special and differential treatment, trade capacity building 
and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) tracks both- what it considers to 
be development and also, who is allowed to claim the moniker and its apparent 
benefits. 13  Other definitions such as High-Income Countries, High-Income 
Developing Countries or Low Income Countries are also significant, particularly in 
understanding the impact of the TTIP negotiations, albeit for trade law, it is 
development which accords preference.14  
 
One of the most interesting examples of both the limitations and utility of multiple 
categorizations of development within the Global South is China. China joined the 
WTO in 2001 self-defining itself as a developing country.15 Upon membership, 
China increasingly amplified its profile within the organization, by altering its 
                                               
11  Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (June 14, 1992). 
12  European Regional Development Fund, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
htpp://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/. 
13 James Harrison, Incentives for Development: The EC’s Generalized System of Preferences, India’s 
WTO Challenge and Reform, 42 COMMON MKT L. REV.  1663 (2005); Joseph Ε Stiglitz & 
Andrew Charlton, Aid for Trade, 5 INT’L J.  DEV. ISSUES 1 (2006); Philippe Cullet, Differential 
Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-State Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 549 (1999) [hereinafter STIGLITZ & CHARLTON]; Bernard Hoekman, Strengthening the 
Global Trade Architecture for Development: The Post Doha Agenda, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 23 
(2002). 
14  Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries Programme, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
htpps://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm; UN Definition, UN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ANALYSIS DIVISION (last updated Oct. 2014), 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml. 
15 Kym Anderson, On the Complexities of China's WTO Accession,   20 WORLD ECON. 749, 764 
(1997). 
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negotiating stance and role in dispute settlement. 16  As part of its global trade 
negotiations, it has joined a number of WTO groups including, amongst others, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the Recent New Members 
(RAMs), the G-33, and the ‘W52’ sponsors. This mix of WTO memberships 
typifies China’s complicated position: as a member of the RAMS, it is amongst 
new members, most of whom are DCs but not LDCs while as a member of the 
W52 sponsors, it supports specific forms of trade protection. As such, China takes 
both a protectionist stance with regard to certain products as well as supporting 
some LDC positions within the Organization, for example in relation to the 
TRIPs, while contemporaneously pushing for ‘freer’ trade with regard to its own 
access to the Global Markets.  Outside the WTO, China holds membership of the 
G20 which represents 85% of global GDP and over 75% of the global trade and at 
present, it is pushing for reforms on governance within the IMF.17 Yet, China is 
excluded in other global trade negotiations such as the TPP. Whilst the World 
Bank describes China as an Upper Middle Income Country and it was the first 
country to reach the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 
number of its people living in extreme poverty and hunger, there is still a large 
swath of the population that remains in poverty.18 Even though China is outside 
both the TTIP and the TPP negotiations,  its economic and political position 
means that it cannot be ignored entirely; although, as discussed later, some EU 
officials appear convinced that China will accommodate any decisions that the 
TTIP negotiators settle upon. As such, it is caught in what Ming Du describes as a 
‘catch-22’ situation where it must wait and see the impact of the TPP and the TTIP 
on its foreign trade and investment, while being a developing country that 
continues to lift its entire population out of poverty.19 
 
LDCs sit in a rather static cornucopia which allows for graduation into the next 
rung of defined economic development, but does not leave any room for states to 
‘regress’ into the category. This may suggest a positive outlook for states following 
                                               
16  For details of disputes involving China see China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm,;Chi 
Manjiao, China’s Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement οver the Past Decade: Experiences and 
Impacts, 15 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 29 (2012). For an account of the Global South’s experience at 
the DSB of the WTO see DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE (Gregory C Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., Cambridge 
University Press 2010).  
17  See G20 Members, G20 (last visited Nov. 26, 2015), http://g20.org/about-g20/g20-
members/. 
18  See China, THE WORLD BANK (last visited Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/china. 
19 Ming Du, Explaining China’s Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
18 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 1, 8 (2015)., 1, 8. 
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a linear trajectory towards an ever positive economic development. However, it has 
been repeatedly shown that such progressive optimism rarely reflects the fate of 
countries or the character of their development beyond purely economic factors.20 
The most consistently applied definition employed across international economic 
institutions operates as a fulcrum of debt relief alongside MDGs with a distinct 
presence within trade law.21 The LDC definition incorporates the gross national 
income per capita, the human asset index (HAI), and the economic vulnerability 
index.22 Whilst the Heavily Indebted Poorer Country (HIPC) Programme identifies 
39 LDCs eligible for debt relief, the EU recognizes 49 countries and the UN 
recognizes 48.23 States that narrowly miss the definition are largely ineligible for 
debt relief or for the WTO’s limited exception for non-reciprocal forms of trade 
arrangements, a factor of some import in the EU’s relations with the Global South 
in its negotiations with the ACP countries. 
 
Six international organizations, the IMF, the International Trade Centre, the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), the World Bank Group, and the WTO operate the 
Enhanced Integrated Framework which grants technical assistance, aid in 
economic growth and poverty eradication programs to LDCs with the intent of 
integrating the Global South into global trade. Of the 48 states recognized as 
                                               
20 F.J.Garcia, Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions, 10 J. INT’L. ECON. L.461 (2007); 
P. Alston, Shortcomings of a Garfield the Cat Approach to the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. 
INT'L L.J. 510 (1985).  
21  Economic development means qualitative change and restructuring in a country's 
economy in connection with technological and social progress. The main indicator of 
economic development is increasing GNP per capita or (GDP per capital). Economic 
growth Refers to the quantitative change or expansion in a country's economy. Economic 
growth is conventionally measured as the percentage increase in gross domestic product 
(GDP) or gross national product (GNP) during one year. See, World Bank Definition, UN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ANALYSIS DIVISION (last visited Nov. 27, 2015), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_data.shtml.   
22 UN LDC Definition, UN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ANALYSIS DIVISION (last updated 
Oct. 2014), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml.  
23  EU’s Programme of Debt Relief, EUR-LEX, 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/development.html?root_default=SUM_1_CO
DED%3D11, SUM_2_CODED%3D1106&locale=en; LDC Criteria, UN DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY AND ANALYSIS DIVISION (last updated Oct. 2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml; The 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm.  
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LDCs by the UN,24 the vast majority, 36 (with several LDC states currently in 
negotiations to join) are members of the WTO and thus part of the policy of full 
global integration into the world trading system.25 From a trade perspective one of 
most important outcomes of a designation as a LDC is the ability to benefit from 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which provides for a system of 
exemptions from the rules contained in the WTO agreements for countries trading 
with the LDCs.  
 
Beyond LDCs, global institutions utilize a range of economic, legal and statistical 
definitions to categories the rest of the Global South. Nevertheless, the UN 
definitions differ from those utilized by both the IMF and the World Bank 
Group.26 Whilst all three have slightly differing aims, purposes and policy outlooks 
regarding development, building trade capacity is a central feature of each 
organization’s agenda. The WTO, whilst following the UN’s definition of LDCs 
enables states, upon membership to self-designate itself as ‘developing’.27 In part, 
this recognizes that states may wish to vary their stance depending on their own 
estimation of what status best suits their economies; yet, it also allows existing 
members to object to such self-designation.28  Further, this designation is upon 
entry to the WTO and cannot be downgraded thereafter, though a country may 
choose to re-designate itself as developed. In turn, this is a further indication of the 
close links between ‘development’ and the ideology of linear an uninterrupted 
progress that still lies at the heart of international law.29  Moreover, this linear 
trajectory is unresponsive to the fact that developing states might choose to self-
identify themselves as ‘developed’ for a series of complicated political reasons. The 
                                               
24 For the current list please see  List of Least Developed Countries, UN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY ANALYSIS DIVISION (last updated May 2016), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf. 
25  For the list of countries see 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm 
26  For the World Bank Group definitions please see World Bank Group Definitions, THE 
WORLD BANK, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-
world-bank-country-and-lending-groups; For the IMF definitions please see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/key/pdf/PRGTEligibleCountries.pdf 
27  See supra note 21;  List of Least Developed Countries, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm. 
28  WTO Policy on Development, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm. 
29 Malcolm Shaw provides one of the most concise summaries of this approach in the 
opening phrase of his classical textbook on international law. See MALCOLM SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (6th ed. Cambridge University Press 2003). (“In the long march of 
mankind from the cave to the computer a central role has always been played by the idea of 
law–the idea that order is necessary and chaos inimical to a just and stable existence.”). 
Winter, 2016]             ‘Mega-Market’ Trade Agreements and the Global South                220 
 
Apartheid in South Africa is a very telling example: after the end of the racist 
regime, South Africa requested to be reclassified as a developing country under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), since the white-supremacist 
regime had opted for ‘joining’ the club of developed states for political reasons 
linked to their self-image. However, South Africa’s request was rejected.30 This 
precedent indicates how the trade system remains unresponsive to the realities of 
the Global South and the political ramifications of certain relevant choices.  
 
Thus, the bulk of the global trade understanding of the South-North and the 
South-South economic relations focus on definitions, designations and building 
trade capacity. This includes latitude for self-categorization and at least from the 
WTO's perspective, the view that the Global South possesses some strength in 
numbers, which enables a purposeful approach reminiscent of the NIEO rather 
than an aid-based designation of assistance. The underlying purpose of integration 
into the global market through capacity building, GSPs, and special and differential 
is rarely critically evaluated. From the perspective of the TTIP negotiations the 
ongoing negative reactions of the Global North to the strength in numbers of the 
Global South within the WTO is an important feature of the context of 
negotiation. The Global South’s assertion of its dissent to the terms of negotiation 
at the WTO, which it perceives as running contrary to the aims of integration on 
equal terms, puts the flood of mega or super markets in a different context than 
the mere inconvenience of fragmentation within international law.31  It is also 
evident that when it comes to the TTIP type negotiations, the Global South once 
again becomes subsumed into a whole. Risse describes the decision to join the 
WTO as a ‘choice between the Scylla of subjection to unwanted and perhaps 
unreasonable norms and the Charybdis of isolation’,32 what is evident from the 
TTIP negotiations is that Charybdis may be the imposed outcome which may lead 
to the same or perhaps a worse result even when Scylla was the chosen option. 
 
III. EU AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
                                               
30 LAMP, supra note 6, at 21 (“It appears that, for South Africa under white rule, being seen 
as a developed country was partly a point of pride; the African National Congress, by 
contrast, saw no shame in South Africa being classified as a developing country. Given 
these ideational connotations of “developing country” status, it should perhaps not be 
surprising that, for a country to decide to change its status, it will often take more than the 
mere fact that it has ascended in the economic league tables.”).   
31  Thomas Cottier, The Common Law of International Trade and the Future of the World Trade 
Organization, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L.  3 (2015) 
32 MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 351 (Princeton University Press 2012). 
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As it has already been stressed, these negotiations do not take place in a legal, 
political or historical vacuum. Indeed, the EU has very specific trade arrangements 
with the Global South. The Global South states, which were once EU member 
states’ colonies or with which certain members have historical links, are at the fore 
of EU’s policy. In turn, differing attitudes of Member States toward their former 
colonies inform EU’s policy in the field.33 Hence, disputes amongst EU members 
as to how relationships with the Global South ought to proceed, cannot be 
decoupled from their historical contexts. Relationships in the postcolonial frame 
are often presented in the context of the Commonwealth or La Francophonie. Whilst 
it is difficult to generalize, the wider historical context under which these 
organizations operate ought not to be underestimated. One relevant example is the 
persistence of hybrid economies in post-colonial states such as Congo or Chad. 
These typically include a modern sector based on a capitalist model, which involves 
exploitation of primary resources and a general economy based on pre-capitalist 
structures geared towards subsistence agriculture, that benefited Europe massively, 
but left post-colonial states at a unique economic disadvantage.34  
 
It is critical to note that the 1957 Treaty of Rome and specifically, Articles 131 and 
136 that were established in a context of imperialism buttress the elements of the 
EU policy, although the empires have been disbanded. Carbone argues that the 
EU’s most recent policy and legal iterations leave little space for meaningful 
engagement of the Global South in the process of settling trade arrangements, 
which nevertheless they must follow to access the EU market.35  
 
Yet, the EU’s treaty obligations interweave co-operation, trade, poverty reduction, 
and most critically, the need to take note of the impact of its own policies on the 
Global South. Under Title III, Article 208.1 of the Lisbon Treaty, ‘the Union’s 
development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction 
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of 
the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which 
are likely to affect developing countries’ and under Article 208.2., ‘the Union and 
the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other 
competent international organizations.’ This two pronged approach appears 
progressive in that it first focuses on poverty eradication but it also takes a fairly 
                                               
33 RODNEY supra note 2. Such states include former colonies of the UK, France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands. 
34 Id. 
35  Maurizio Carbone, The EU and the Developing World: Partnership, Poverty, Politiziation, in  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 325 (Christopher Hill & 
Michael Smith eds. 2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2011). 
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typical Global North perspective on what the objectives ought to be. Second, 
whilst the Article recognizes development co-operation, particularly the UN’s 
approach and the effect of policies on DCs, there is no requirement to actually 
integrate the Global South’s view of development into its practices.  
 
The Cotonou Agreement forms the backbone of the EU's arrangements with the 
ACP states (African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries) and is currently in the 
process of renegotiation. 36  Arguably, the preceding Yaoundé and Lomé 
Agreements incorporated a more partnership-oriented approach combining trade 
with aid, than what their successor does.37 It is clear from the Cotonou Agreement 
that the EU is largely on board with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, which 
is the neoliberal approach to development that focuses on privatization and 
expansion of market forces within an economy, as the only means to achieve 
development.38 For example, one of the Cotonou Agreement’s core objectives is 
the integration of the ACP countries into the global economy and as such, states 
receiving aid must agree to macroeconomic changes monitored by the EU. An 
alternate option for Global South states wishing to trade with the EU, is to enter 
into the Generalized System of Preferences of the Special Incentive Arrangement 
for Sustainable Development and Good Governance, which requires full 
incorporation into the global market.39 In his report to the UNDP, Dani Rodrik 
questions whether trade liberalization improves a country’s development and 
suggests that this conclusion depends on the perspective the evaluator begins 
with.40 The relationships between these DCs and LDCs and the EU are currently 
                                               
36  EU Policy Regarding Contonou, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:r12101 (last visited Nov.26, 2015). 
37  Albeit the Yaoundé Agreement was originally conceived during the final pangs of 
European colonialism and as with the Treaty of Rome must be considered in that context. 
See Richard Gibb, Post-Lomé: The European Union and the South, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 457 
(2000) [hereinafter GIBB];  Maria Perrson & Fredrik Wilhelmsson, Assessing the Effects of EU 
Trade Preference for Developing Countries, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: TRADE, AID AND GROWTH IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 30-3 (Yves Bourdet 
et al. eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2007). 
38 For the developmental policies of neoliberalism and the emergence of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’, see Jennifer Bair, Taking Aim at the New International Economic Order, in THE 
ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 
147 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., Harvard University Press 2009). 
39  EU Policy on Trade with the Global South, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential
/article_781_en.htm.  
40  DANI RODRIK, UNDP, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE AS IF DEVELOPMENT 
REALLY MATTERED (July 2001), 
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covered by the 2008-2013 Revised Cotonou Agreement. With each re-negotiation, 
there has been an increasing focus on the reduction of trade barriers, such as rules 
of origin and other restrictions which impact the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy intermixed with migration restrictions and security.  
 
One of the most significant changes instigated under the Cotonou Agreement was 
the institution of full reciprocal trade. Under the Lomé, whilst the ACP states had 
duty-free access to the EU, they were permitted to retain some trade barriers to 
protect their fragile hybrid economies. The replacement of these trade preferences 
with the Economic Partnership Agreements established reciprocal trade 
agreements with duty free access for both sets of countries, albeit states covered by 
an LDC designation were afforded special and differential treatment. At present, 
the Agreement requires the ACP countries to provide duty-free access to their own 
markets for EU exports. The partial rationale for this was the need to comply with 
the WTO law which does not permit non-reciprocal trade arrangements beyond 
the LDCs. Whilst the WTO members agreed to a waiver and the Cotonou 
Agreement was re-negotiated, there is little suggestion that the EU fought to retain 
these key provisions in favor of the ACP states.41 This insistence of reciprocity 
demonstrates the interactions between trade negotiations at the regional and global 
level and how it is impossible to understand these negotiations in isolation, for the 
reason being that together they form the context in which the Global South must 
compete.42 
 
As is required under the EU’s own treaties, the EU and its Member States’ 
commitments to the MDGs, amongst other legal obligations, need to be 
paramount in considering the impact of the TTIP and the Cotonou Agreement 
upon the Global South. It is critical that the EU, in negotiating the TTIP, will not 
further undermine the remaining favorable elements of the Cotonou Agreement or 
its own constitutional obligations toward the Global South. The EU appears to be 
following the WTO in ‘forcing’ a change in the key benefits that accrue to the 
Global South or, at least, to the ACP members since the EU’s policy excludes 
other DCs from group negotiations.43 The ACP states are at the table, even if the 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/global-governance-of-trade.pdf> 
[hereinafter RODRIK]. 
41 GIBB, supra note 30, at 457.  
42 For details of EU’s trade position see EU’s trade position, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (last 
updated 6th May, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/africa-
caribbean-pacific. 
43 Albeit the broader nature of the benefits are contestable; for example, the Bananas Cases 
which alongside the EU and US, pitted the ACP members against other Global South 
states. 
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current re-negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement leads to an Agreement which no 
longer grants any specific preferential treatment or introduces regulatory 
frameworks that nullify trade concessions or create non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Within the WTO system, changes to the global trading system can be ameliorated 
by the Global South’s strength in numbers and increased South-South co-
operation. The apparent lack of interest from the EU in seeing the impact of the 
TTIP upon the Global South suggests that the creation of the mega-market is 
taking priority and that it is largely ignoring its own self-imposed obligations to the 
DCs. 
 
IV. GLOBAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
A. The Geography of ‘Mega-Regionals’  
 
To fully appreciate the impact of the TTIP upon the Global South, we need to 
take into consideration other trade agreements, in particular, the TPP (Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States, and Vietnam) 44  and the CETA (Canada and the EU) 45 . It is 
important to emphasize that most of the participants have pre-existing Free Trade 
Agreements and are members of the WTO. For instance, the TTIP is not the first 
trans-Atlantic trade deal: the Transatlantic Declaration (1990), the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (1995), the Transatlantic Economic Partnership(1998), and 
the Transatlantic Economic Council (2007) all serve as precursor agreements. 
However, it is the depth and breadth of the TTIP that makes it of critical 
importance to the Global South. Further, the size of the markets created by these 
agreements, either as Free Trade Areas or Customs Unions, will dominate the 
global regulatory framework for states other than the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China, South Africa) whose own markets and relative market power enable 
them to negotiate with these larger groupings on a somewhat equal footing. This is 
a point to which we will return shortly.  
 
In turn, the TPP contains a mix of the Global South and North states and in its 
original incarnation, was intended to be amongst a much smaller group of states.46 
                                               
44  For the full text of the agreement, see https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text. 
45 For the updated text of the agreement that includes EU's proposal for the establishment 
of a permanent court of arbitration and the explicit protection of the 'right to regulate', see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf. 
46 Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. For an early evaluation of TPP (before its 
conclusion), see Raj Bhala, Trans-Pacific Partnership or Trampling Poor Partners? A Tentative 
Critical Review, 11 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 2 (2014).  
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The TPP, as it includes states of the Global South, is the only negotiation of the 
three, to directly tackle the patent differences in size and economic power of the 
signatories. Nonetheless, like the CETA and the TTIP, there is minimal concern 
for Global South states outside of the negotiation. On the other hand, the CETA 
resembles the TTIP in its immediate make-up (EU-Canada), even though the 
volume of trade involved is more limited. Reoccurring features, such as the 
intellectual property protection which is similar to the TRIPs-plus, extends the 
remit of IP protection beyond the global negotiated process envisaged by the 
WTO, environmental concerns, food safety, access to medicines (perhaps re-
opening the access to medicines debate that was so fraught early in the WTO’s 
operation and which had to be vigorously fought by the Global South),47 and 
specifically regarding the CETA, public banking in Canada and Investment 
Protection and Investor-State-Dispute Settlement, are ever present critiques of all 
three treaties, which is discussed below.48 The recent changes to CETA’s Investor-
State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS), including the introduction of an appeals process 
and ethical standards to avoid conflict of interest amongst panel members along 
with the changes to the appointment of panel members to bring it in line with the 
TTIP’s ISDS provisions, suggests that some of the disquiet about their operation 
has had an effect.49 However, the core critiques on the ISDS more generally and 
the specific provisions of the TTIP and the CETA regarding the prioritizing of 
investors over public policy, the lack of oversight from domestic courts, and the 
absence of democratic oversight remain.50 
 
B. The Collapse of the Doha Development Round and its Implications for the Developing 
World 
 
                                               
47 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public 
Health of 14 November 2001,, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002); Duncan 
Matthews, WTO Decision of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, On the TRIPs Agreement and 
Public Health: A solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73 
(2004). 
48 Susy Frankel, Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 
12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023 (2009); Jean-Frédéric Morin, Multilateralizing TRIPs‐Plus 
Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. World Intell. Prop. 175 (2009); Frederick M 
Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public 
Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 317 (2005). 
49 CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, (Feb. 29, 2016),http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468. 
50  Himaloya Saha, A Critical Analysis of the Commonly Recommended Reforms of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 4 LEGAL ISSUES J. 39 (2016); Ingo Venzke, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement in TTIP from the Perspective of a Public Law Theory of International Adjudication, 17 J. 
WORLD. INV. & TRADE (forthcoming 2016). 
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The failure of the Doha Development Round (DDR) of negotiations at the WTO, 
whose core aim was to improve the status of developing member states, is a major 
driver of current trade negotiations.51 The failure of the DDR, following the brief 
interlude of global negotiations preceding and following the creation of the WTO, 
is both a symptom and a trend of the fragmented nature of global trade 
negotiations and the North’s disregard of the Global South.52 Matsushita argues 
that the WTO will find a role amongst these mega FTAs, but as in themselves, 
they will not resolve the issues of world trade law necessary to create a 
comprehensive system.53  But this approach disregards the place of the Global 
South within these negotiations. Matsushita’s argument that the WTO Agreement 
and its Annexes may become one of many ‘Magna Cartas’ within trade law misses 
the limitations, purpose of that historical document, and importantly, its fictional 
role in creating a human rights basis within English medieval law.54 The DDR 
required a minimum buy-in by the Global South to the trade liberalization agenda 
and was always going to benefit the stronger economic powers within the Global 
South more than others. That said the movement of the Global North away from 
direct negotiations with the Global South and the linguistic turn to refer to it as the 
Doha Round rather than as the Doha Development Round, suggests that the WTO 
may have become an uncomfortable forum for the Global North.  
 
One reason for the discomfiture with the DDR is that unlike other international 
institutions linked to global trade, such as the IMF, the World Bank Group, or the 
UN, the WTO’s decision-making processes operate on a one-country-one-vote 
system combined with qualified majorities for certain decisions.55 This entrenched 
process of consensus decision-making at the WTO may have a negative impact 
upon the ability of some states to stand alone against the tide of opinion; yet, the 
WTO remains one of the few international organizations which actually abides by 
the concept of state equality no matter the economic or other might of its 
                                               
51 Gillian Moon, Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L.  617 
(2009); Antoine Bouet & David Laborde, Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round, 9 
WORLD TRADE REV. 319 (2010); Gillian Moon, Fair in Form, But Discriminatory in 
Operation—WTO Law’s Discriminatory Effects on Human Rights in Developing Countries, 14 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 553 (2011).  
52 RODRIK, supra note 33; STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 11.  
53 Mitsuo Matsushita, A View on Future Roles of the WTO: Should There Be More Soft Law in the 
WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 701 (2014). 
54 Id. at 701-715. 
55  The exception being the EU which as a WTO has a vote equivalent to that of its 
Member States, see Surya P Subedi, The Notion of Free Trade and the First Ten Years of the World 
Trade Organization: How Level Is the ‘Level Playing Field’?, 53 NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 273 (2006). 
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members.56 This reality has led to the development of several different alliances 
amongst the Global South that enable states to combine their economic weight. 
These include the Cairns Group (19 Agricultural Exporting Countries which 
includes Australia, Canada, and South Africa), the Cotton-4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali), and the aforementioned ACP, amongst others.57 These alliances 
are mirrored by groupings of developed or large economic powers, the most 
obvious being the EU, as well as the Quad (Canada, EU, Japan, and the US and 
the G-20). Alliances amongst the Global South have largely been attempts to move 
away from the Green Room form of negotiations, where a small group of select 
states came together to resolve difficult issues excluding other members. Whilst 
Green Room type negotiations remain at the WTO, the South-South alliances have 
gone someway to construct barriers to such exclusionary practices.58  
 
The rise of the TTIP, the TPP, and the CETA means that while economically 
strong groups set the terms for market access, it will become far more difficult for 
the Global South, with the possible exception of the BRICS, to negotiate on (even 
formally) equal terms or indeed block changes which may have a significant 
negative impact upon their economies. Beyond the character of the decision-
making, perhaps more critically, the WTO system ensured that all states, 
irrespective of capacity or trade delegation size, could theoretically be aware of all 
ongoing trade negotiations. Admittedly, the ability to do so remains dependent on 
the capacity of often small delegations in Geneva to attend multiple meetings and 
become an expert on a myriad of topics. However, the move away from the WTO, 
represented by the TTIP, the TPP, and the CETA, makes it far more difficult for 
those states with limited delegation capacities to maintain full knowledge of the 
changes which could potentially impact their economies or even voice their 
concerns. The rise of this type of agreements is also part of the ‘noodle/spaghetti 
bowl’. This is a metaphor for the growing trend of fragmentation of international 
trade and investment law, as the ever-increasing number of regional trade 
                                               
56  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations art.ix, art.x, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 14; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & 
Lother Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the 
World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International 
Trade?, 8 J. INT’L INT’L. ECON. L. 51 (2005); Richard H Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or 
Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339,340 
(2002).  
57  AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT & WTO (Taylor & Francis 2005). 
58 Sonia E Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 
HARV. INT’L; L. J. 483 (2007); Kent Jones, Green Room Politics and the WTO's Crisis of 
Representation, 9 PROGRESS DEV. STUD. 349 (2009); Mateo Diego-Fernandez, Trade 
Negotiations Make Strange Bedfellows, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 423 (2008). 
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agreements make a singular global snapshot of trade regulation near impossible.59 
As Benvenisti and Downs already observed in 2007, fragmentation of international 
economic law ought not to be seen as an accident, but as a conscious strategy on 
the behalf of powerful states, and especially the US, in order to weaken the 
negotiating position of their weaker counterparts.60 
 
What is also of direct relevance here is that the TTIP, the TPP, and the CETA 
demonstrate a move against the trend toward increased transparency amongst 
international financial institutions, which admittedly was starting from an extremely 
low point (and is perhaps mirrored by concerns regarding the ISDS).61 The non-
publication of the full terms of negotiation makes it difficult for the Global South 
to voice their objections to changes to the global economic trading system or 
undertake domestic or regional reforms in anticipation of a new trading regime. 
Further, whilst the Cotonou Agreement is currently being reworked on one side, 
the EU is fully cognizant of the wider political context of what is being negotiated. 
Further, the ACP countries must negotiate with one arm tied behind their backs as 
there is no knowledge of what the interaction between the Cotonou and the TTIP 
will be once both are operative. Although, political exigencies may make 
publication difficult, the democratic nature of the US and the EU Member States 
as well as the EU’s attempts to gain assurance as to its democratic legitimacy ought 
to make transparency, where security or commercial secrets are not at issue, an 
imperative of accountable governance and the rule of law.62 Such a commitment 
would also enable the welcome move towards transparency amongst international 
financial institutions to continue, rather than putting a halt to this positive trend. 
 
C. Institutional Shifts and the Exclusion of the ‘Won’t-Do’ States 
 
At this point, it is worth recalling how the process of institutional ‘shopping’ is not 
unprecedented in the history of international trade law. For example, one of the 
major tactical manoeuvres of the Global North in the wake of the NIEO was the 
                                               
59  Won-Mog Choi, Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Prospect and Jurisprudence, 6 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 49 (2003); Francis Snyder, China, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Law, 43 
J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2009). 
60 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597-599(2007).  
61  Luis Hinojosa Martinez, Transparency in International Financial Institutions, in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2013); Panagiotis Delimatsis, Institutional Transparency in the 
WTO, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW , ibid,  at 112. 
62  ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31-44, 74-77 (Cambridge 
University Press 2012).  
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prioritization of the World Bank and the IMF in matters of global economic 
governance over the relevant UN institutions, such as the UNCTAD, which were 
understood as having been ‘high jacked’ by the then Third World.63 Admittedly, 
there are limits to this analogy. First, the Bretton Woods institutions already 
existed when the Global North upgraded their role. Here, the EU and the US opt 
for creating a new institutional structure to bypass the WTO. Second, it is not 
possible to equate the radical demands of the NIEO with the positions of the 
Global South during the DDR. The latter to a significant extent incorporates the 
dominant orthodoxy about the unquestionable benefits of trade liberalization and 
seeks to ameliorate the position of the said states within the current architecture.64 
The aspirations of the NIEO were more far-reaching.65 Keeping these differences 
in mind, the eventual defeat of the NIEO points to the far-reaching impact of 
institutional shifts; it is worth reflecting on the historical parallel. 66 Koskenniemi 
once wrote that ‘once one knows which institution will deal with an issue, one 
already knows how it will be disposed of’.67 In this case, if mega-regionals become 
the main institutional loci for organizing global trade, the disregard of the interests 
and the opinions of the Global South is to be expected.  
 
It is indicative that the former US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick describes 
current mega-market deals from the US perspective as moving global trade 
negotiation forward without the ‘won’t-do countries’ and pressing towards free 
                                               
63 See The United States in the Opposition in MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE 
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (PENGUIN 2012) [hereinafter MAZOWER].  
64 Ha-Joon Chang, Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: How Development Has Disappeared from 
Today’s ‘Development’ Discourse, in TOWARDS NEW DEVELOPMENTALISM: MARKET AS MEANS 
RATHER THAN MASTER 51 (Shahrukh Rafi Khan & Jen Christiansen eds., Routledge 2010)( 
“Even as they disagree on who should cut their tariffs and subsidies in which areas by how 
much, most people seem to accept the principle behind the agenda itself – that the 
developed countries should specialize in industry and the developing countries should 
specialize in agriculture and therefore that whatever is making that specialization difficult 
should be criticized.”). 
65  “As Kellogg himself points out (though again in a slightly puzzled tone) ‘many 
[underdeveloped countries] appear to be very afraid of big American private companies, 
and [many also] believe in varying degrees of socialism” PAHUJA, supra note 3, at 121.  
66 MAZOWER ,  supra note 62, at 317.( “UNCTAD was defanged with the appointment of a 
Washington-friendly secretary-general in 1984, and turned into a harmless accessory to the 
extraordinary transformation of capitalism that now took place under President Reagan and 
his successors. With not only UNCTAD but the UN itself side-lined, and international 
economic coordination run through the World Bank and the IMF- two institutions firmly 
in the control of the West- the United States emerged out of opposition.”). 
67 Martii Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 
MOD. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007). 
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trade with the ‘can-do countries’.68 This ignores the rationale behind the DDR, 
which at least nominally was about securing a fairer deal for the Global South. In 
moving forward, from the perspective of the TTIP, the TPP, and the CETA, with 
the countries which in combination control two thirds of global output is, as the 
Financial Times describes, ‘part of a grand strategy to conclude an only slightly less 
ambitious version of the Doha round by other means.’69 But arguably, this will be a 
Doha Round without the Development Agenda (which had already been much 
watered down anyway). Moving the ‘won’t-do’ countries to positions which they 
have explicitly rejected, is not moving with the ‘can-do’ countries. Rather, it is a 
process of coercing other states outside a forum in which they were able to reject 
negative policies, to make accommodations which they had previously rejected.70 
After all, as Benvenisti and Downs have noted 'creating or shifting to an alternative 
venue when the original one becomes too responsive to the interests of weaker 
states and their agents' is a core fragmentation strategy deployed by powerful 
states.71 
 
Even the rhetorical tactic of describing such countries as intransigents is dismissive 
and infantilizing, since it suggests that if only they were mature enough to see what 
needs to be done, they would be reasonable and agree. But, of course, those 
‘won’t-do’ countries that eventually blocked the DDR were those in the Global 
South that either had the economic power such as Brazil or India, to stand on their 
own or were able to prevent changes being pushed through by sheer numbers in 
one of the many alliances within the WTO. It is worth recalling here that there is 
significant precedent to this tactic. Between 1995 and 1998, states of the Global 
North negotiated the (failed) Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) under 
the auspices of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development.72 
The Agreement was never concluded mainly due to NGOs of the Global North 
campaigning against it. As Sornarajah points out, MAI rested upon the 
presumption that foreign investment was exclusively beneficial for host states,73 
while states of the Global South were systematically excluded from the negotiation 
                                               
68 David Pilling & Shawn Donnan, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Ocean’s Twelve, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Sept. 22, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/8c253c5c-2056-11e3-b8c6-
00144feab7de.  
69 Id.  
70 Rorden Wilkinson, Of Butchery and Bicycles: The WTO and the ‘Death’ of the Doha Development 
Agenda, 83 POL. Q. 395 (2012); Susan C Schwab, After Doha: Why the Negotiations are Doomed 
and What We Should Do about It, 90 FOREIGN AFF.  104, 105 (2011). 
71 For more detail, see http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/, (last visited Nov. 26, 2015). 
72 For more detail, see http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/, (last visited Nov. 26, 2015).. 
73  MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 259 (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
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process, since they could, at best, acquire observer status.74 The failure of this 
strategy can also be said to be at the heart of this overt shift to bilateralism.  
 
V. FROM MULTILATERALISM TO BILATERALISM AND BACK?  
 
As has been stressed, the failure of the DDR was instrumental in the gradual 
emergence of mega-markets and new FTAs. Two aspects of this process warrant 
attention: first, the potential that the sheer size of the markets arising from the 
TTIP/CETA/TPP will force other states to follow and second, the confidence of 
the Global North (especially the US) that the TTIP/TPP can serve as tools in a 
geopolitical competition with China, is potentially destabilizing and reflects 
hubristic over-confidence.  
 
A. Potential Trade Diversion and Bilateralism as a Tactical Manoeuvre   
 
As they make trade between contracting states easier and more cost-effective in 
comparison to that with outsiders, trade agreements, by their very nature, give rise 
to trade diversion that reconstructs the map of trade relations. This occurs through 
lowering of tariffs and harmonizing non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB).75 Arguably, 
in the case of the TTIP, the impact of the former will be secondary, since tariffs 
are already relatively low between the US and the EU. Xiaotong, Ping and Xiaoyan 
calculate that the effects of trade diversion, following the TTIP, for China, it will 
be approximately USD 39 billion, and EUR 145 billion vis-à-vis the US and the EU 
markets respectively.76 Thus, given that tariff levels between the EU and the US 
are relatively low, the NTB-related aspects of the agreements are expected to have 
greater impact both domestically and on third parties. 
 
                                               
74  Id. (“Some developing states did participate in the discussion as observers. Others 
offered comments from the sidelines, but, on the whole, developing states were absent 
from the proceedings.”). 
75 This evolution follows the trend identified by Andrew Lang regarding international trade 
law after the rise of neoliberalism, when an increasing number of regulations were 
reconceptualised as discriminatory, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER 
NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 264 (Oxford University 
Press 2011). (“As a result of these trends in the jurisprudence, the non-discrimination norm 
became a much more powerful tool to wield against domestic regulation, even that which 
was apparently ‘non-discriminatory’ in the sense that the term had been traditionally 
understood. Discrimination began to look very much like ‘trade-distorting market 
intervention’.”). 
76 Zhang Xiaotong et al., The EU’s New FTA Adventures and Their Implications for China, 48 J. 
WORLD TRADE  525, 536-7 (2014) [hereinafter XIAOTONG ET AL.].  
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Moreover, Low estimates that NTBs-related cost reductions in primary agricultural 
products could be around 23 per cent.77 Further, it is estimated that there will be a 
3.3 per cent to 2.3 per cent reduction following lower tariff costs. Even if these 
calculations are overestimated, it is still arguably the case that trading in primary 
agricultural products between the two markets will become significantly cheaper. 
In turn, this will cause trade diversion, which will affect the LDCs more than it will 
affect, for example, China. This means that aspects of the TTIP will hit the most 
vulnerable states hardest, thereby potentially hindering their development. 
Critically, it was also in agriculture where the most significant disputes between the 
Global North and South occurred at the WTO. As it is now known, developed 
states undermined the core objectives of the Doha Declaration since it was 
perceived that trade liberalization in agriculture would mainly benefit developing 
states: ‘The Doha Declaration mandates comprehensive negotiations to improve 
market access, reduce or phase out export subsidies, and reduce trade-distorting 
domestic support. Further, it explicitly provides that special and differential 
treatment for developing countries will be integral to the final agreement on 
agricultural trade rules.78 Even though we are not convinced that the interests of 
the Global South should be juxtaposed to those of small and medium-scale 
agriculture in developed states,79 this circumvention of the Global South, especially 
in an area of high interest, is particularly problematic.  
 
The very nature of agricultural products complicates the situation for the DCs and 
the LDCs. Even if these states are able and willing to undertake the technical and 
financial costs of meeting the new standards, these changes coupled with the 
sensitive nature of their products will almost inevitably lead to disruptions in trade, 
loss of crops, and at least some years of decreased income. Given the fragile 
economic and political conditions in many of these states, even short-term 
disruptions in trade could significantly hinder their development in the long run.  
 
                                               
77 Patrick Low, TTIP and the World Trading System, in CATALYST? TTIP’S IMPACT ON THE 
REST 21 (Simon J Evenett et al. eds.,EPR Press 2015).  
78 Jordana Hunter, Broken Promise: Trade, Agriculture and Development in the WTO, 4 MELB. J. 
INT’L L.  299, 315 (2003).  
79 Anne Orford, Food Security, Free Trade, and the Battle for the State, 11 J. INT’L L & INT’L REL. 
1, 67 (2015) (“In my view, this is not the time to demand that the European countryside 
begin to be managed in the same way that the countryside of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America has been, but rather this is a moment to revisit the alternatives to the management 
of agriculture and rural life that might yet be available.”).  
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On the other hand, a 2013 report on the impact of the TTIP on low-income 
countries suggested that it would be negligible.80 This assertion was based on the 
assumption that their economies would not be competing in areas covered by the 
TTIP; this is partially true, but based on an assumption that these countries will 
remain primary resource exporters or maintain their hybrid economies. Further, it 
also assumes that states of the Global South will change their regulations to 
compensate. A recent report on the potential impact of the TPP on non-members 
reached strikingly similar conclusions, once again assuming that non-members 
would follow the regulatory trends set by the treaty.81 These positions assume first, 
that non-member states can anticipate what the mega-regionals will contain, 
second, that they have the capacity to comply and third, that the regulatory 
changes to accommodate the TTIP, the TPP, or the CETA ought to be a 
priority.82 But the Global South’s absence from negotiations makes it impossible 
for these countries to adjudge for themselves or make plans to ameliorate its 
impact particularly as fluctuations in global trade tend to outrun its regulation.  
 
Consequently, the move away from multilateralism remains significant. As already 
stressed, the turn to bilateralism is directly linked to the failure of the DDR. 
Nonetheless, as Alessandrini argues, it was the way this failure was interpreted that 
signals the move away from multilateralism, rather than the objective fact of its 
failure. 83  Alessandrini problematizes the response of the WTO to this failure, 
which was basically a reaffirmation of ‘trade liberalization as the universally 
desirable means for stimulating growth.’84 Crucially, the decline of international 
trade after the 2008 financial crisis was seen as a sign of insufficient liberalization, 
and not as, for example, symptomatic of ‘insufficient demand at the global level’85 
attributable to the steadily declining share of national income going to workers not 
only in the West, but also in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, 
                                               
80  JIM ROLLO ET AL., DEP’T. INT’L DEV., POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP ON SELECTED DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  (2013) available at http:// r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/193679/Default. Aspx.  
81  Csilla Lakatos et al., Topical Issues: Potential Macroeconomic Implications of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, 219 GLOBAL ECON. PROSPECTS, Jan. 2016, available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2016a/Global-
Economic-Prospects-January-2016-Spillovers-amid-weak-growth.pdf.  
82 ROLLO ET AL., supra note 69. 
83 Donatella Alessandrini, WTO at a Crossroads: The Crisis of Multilateral Trade and the Political 
Economy of the Flexibility Debate, 5 TRADE L. & DEV. 256 (2013) [hereinafter ALESSANDRINI].  
84 Id. at 258; World Trade Organization [WTO], DDG Rugwabiza warns protectionism will hurt 
global growth (Nov.4, 2011), 
hTPPs://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/ddg_04nov11_e.htm.  
85 ALESSANDRINI, supra note 72, at 261.   
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and Latin America.86 It is important to note here that Susan Schwab and Karan 
Bhatia explicitly conceive the TTIP as an alternative to traditional, Keynesian 
models of economic stimulus in times of crisis.87 
 
Hence, the turn to bilateralism is not only linked to which actors will be included 
and which excluded, but  also has a specific content, for instance, further trade 
liberalization, at least in certain sectors. In turn, along with numerous statements 
from the US/EU officials, the fact that the turn to bilateralism is linked to a 
specific solution to the DDR deadlock indicates that bilateralism is on part of the 
Global North, more of a tactical manoeuvre rather than a long-term strategic 
choice. Former EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht provided an insight to 
this when he argued publicly that: ‘the EU-US combined weight in the global 
economy means that many who will to sell to our markets will have an interest in 
moving towards whatever rules we can achieve’.88 Presumably, the EU and the US 
hope that by temporarily by-passing the WTO, they will be able to create an 
objective market reality that will force the DCs and the LDCs into dropping their 
objections and start adhering to the new rules, in order to maintain their trade 
flows with the US and the EU. Hence, this is a way of by-passing equal sovereignty 
as (imperfectly) reflected in the voting processes of the WTO, by creating a de facto 
situation where the Global South will exercise its formal(istic) sovereign right to 
consent to certain regulations without having influenced their formation.89  
 
B. The Limits of Manoeuvring: the Colonial Past of International Law and China’s 
Contemporary Role in Global Trade 
 
As has already been stressed, it is not feasible to treat all developing states as a 
homogenous group. Their diversity will also determine the degree of success of the 
trend towards tactical bilateralism. Thus, it is likely that the pressure exerted upon 
                                               
86 Stephanie Sequino, The Global Economic Crisis, Its Gender and Ethnic Implications, and Policy 
Responses, 18 GENDER & DEV. 186 (2015).  
87 Susan Schwab & Karan Bhatia, Why Mega-Regionals? in Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: 
Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the Trading System? 18 (Global Agenda 
Council on Trade & Foreign Direct Investment, World Economic Forum edn., 2014) 
[hereinafter MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAME-CHANGERS OR COSTLY 
DISTRACTIONS FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM?].  
88  Karel De Gucht, A European perspective on Transatlantic Conference, European 
Conference at Harvard Kennedy School: Europe 2.0: Taking the Next Step, Cambridge, 
USA (2 March 2013).  
89 See, however, Howse, who argues that WTO law would pose limits to the regulatory 
convergence between mega-regionals' members, Robert Ηοwse, Regulatory Cooperation, 
Regional Trade Agreements, and World Trade Law: Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2016).  
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the LDCs to concede to whatever standards the TTIP/CETA/TPP will set will be 
much more effective than the pressure exerted upon, say, China. This further raises 
an issue regarding the geopolitical objectives of the TTIP and (especially) the TPP 
and the potentially uncontrollable consequences of this tactical bilateralism. 
Despite the intention of the Global North to return to multilateralism in the mid-
term, the potential unwillingness of China to accept its exclusion from 
international norm-making might lead to the fragmentation of the world trade 
rules into competing trading blocks. After all, it is a common point raised by 
commentators that apart from the general tactical gesture described above, the 
TPP and the TTIP are part of the strategy especially of the US, to contain the rise 
of China and shift its priorities from the Middle East to the Pacific.90 Crucially, and 
despite the reserved stance of its political leadership, this is what the Chinese 
scholars seem to believe: ‘In many ways’ China’s views about the TTIP and the 
EU-Japan FTA are largely influenced by the overall context of the US pivoting 
towards Asia and its rediscovery of the TPP as a geo-strategic vehicle for re-
asserting its influence in Asia-Pacific.91 
 
The confidence of the EU and the US that China, along with the rest of the world, 
will sooner or later concede to their mutually agreed standards is unjustifiable and 
capable of destabilizing the international system. The Global North appears to 
systematically underestimate the determination of China to make itself a major 
player in international law and importantly, to overcome the ‘trauma’ of 19th and 
20th century legal imperialism against it. This situation is commonly described as 
China’s determination to stop being a ‘rule taker’ and become a ‘rule maker’.92 It 
needs to be stressed here that this determination is not simply reflective of the will 
of a rising power that seeks to modify the international (legal) realm. Rather, it is 
also symptomatic of China’s determination to decisively overcome its ‘century of 
humiliation’ (1840s-1940s), when it was subjected to the economic and political 
power of the West through a semi-colonial regime that led to the opium trade wars 
                                               
90  Maia Pal, Old Alliances, New Struggles: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, hTPPs://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/old-alliances-
new-struggles.(“One of Obama’s crucial foreign policy aims is the ‘Pacific pivot’, a move 
away from the Middle East and towards the Pacific region. TPP (whose origins go back to 
2005) is a major part of this move, and it responds to Chinese efforts at securing free-trade 
zones with ASEAN. Competition between China and the USA over the region remains 
crucial. Thus, moving away from the WTO is a way of responding more aggressively to 
changing geopolitical patterns, and to threats from China and Russia.”). 
91 XIAOTONG ET AL., supra note 67, at 545.  
92 Dan Ciuriak, Mega Regionals and the Developing Countries, Comments at the Trade 
Workshop Held under the Auspices of the Centre for Global Development and the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Washington, D.C. (June 24, 2014), at 
7 [hereinafter CIURIAK].  
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and to the imposition of free trade zones such as in Hong Kong or Shanghai.93 
Crucially, international law, in the form of unequal treaties, was central in the 
construction of this regime. 94 In a recent statement,95  China’s foreign minister 
stressed the imperialist origins of China’s interaction with international law and its 
determination not to allow repetition of such a relationship.96 Arguably, although 
the ΤΤΙP/TPP/CETA are not as intrusive as 19th century ‘gunboat diplomacy’, the 
determination of the US and the EU (and Canada) to unilaterally set the standards 
for international trade is certainly reminiscent of 19th century Western 
exceptionalism. Once more, the West appears unwilling to confront its imperialist 
past (and present), which can turn out to be disastrous even on a tactical level.  
 
Thus, China has not remained inactive in light of these events. Even though it is 
rhetorically committed to multilateralism,97 its actual practice is more complicated. 
It has already concluded an FTA with Switzerland, a major European economy,98 
and is actively pursuing FTAs with Japan and Korea, Australia, and crucially, 
                                               
93  As a ‘semi-civilized’ country, China stood in a peculiar position of selective 
inclusion/exclusion vis-à-vis international law: See MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE 
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 129 
(Cambridge University Press 2001).(“In this respect, international lawyers routinely 
distinguished between non-European communities of different degrees of civilization. For 
example, in a 1891 study of the concept of the protectorate, the German public law expert 
Paul Heilborn used Lorimer’s scheme to distinguish between the relation Europeans had 
with civilized non-European stats (such as Japan, China, Persia and with non-civilized 
communities (Stammen). While international law was inapplicable to both, a number of its 
rules could be applied in the relations Europeans maintained with the former group.”). 
94 See generally Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal 
Empire, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L. L. 335 (2005).   
95  Wang Yi,Minister of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, China, a Staunch 
Defender and Builder of International Rule of Law (Oct. 24, 2014),  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1204247.s
html  
96 Id. (“In the more than 100 years after the Opium War, colonialism and imperialism 
inflicted untold sufferings on China. For many years, China was unjustly deprived of the 
right by imperialist powers to equal application of international law. The Chinese people 
fought indomitably and tenaciously to uphold China's sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity and founded New China.’, ‘China ardently hopes for the rule of law in 
international relations against hegemony and power politics, and rules-based equity and 
justice, and hopes that the humiliation and sufferings it was subjected to will not happen to 
others.”).   
97 XIAOTONGET AL., supra note 67, at 547.   
98 Circular, Entry into force of the bilateral Switzerland-China free trade agreement on 1 
July, 2014, available at 
http://www.ezv.admin.ch/pdf_linker.php?doc=zirkular_china_06_14_englisch.   
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Western Asia. 99  On a broader scale, the decision to establish the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) alongside the BRICS’ anticipated 
development indicates that the Bretton Woods institutions’ monopoly over 
developmental issues is set to be challenged.100 Presumably, China will not easily 
give up on the WTO, as Chinese elites consider their state to be one of the primary 
beneficiaries of the Organization.101 Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the 
tactical manoeuvres of the US and the EU will eventually be proven successful. It 
is also conceivable that it will lead to a fragmentation of international trade law in 
competing regimes. As Ciuriak has observed, this ‘Balkanization’ of the global 
market can only be to the detriment of the weaker developing states.102 Further, 
one need not necessarily agree with Andrew Gamble that ‘economic blocks also 
tend to become military blocks’103 to conclude that this potential fragmentation of 
international trade in competing blocks could be destabilising for the system of 
international relations.104 Even in the most modest scenarios of two competing 
trading blocks, it is highly likely that certain LDCs which rely on the EU/US and 
China for their international trade will be squeezed trying to strike a potentially 
impossible balance between their trading partners. For example, although the EU 
remains Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest trading partner with 25 per cent, China at 
present accounts for 15% of their international trade.105. Hence, ‘[a] question that 
arises is how Sub-Saharan African nations and regions will react, should mega-
regional agreements fail to reach coherence and lead to fragmented governance 
                                               
99 India, China, ASEAN, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand are currently 
negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).  
100  Diane Desierto, Breaking the Washington Consensus? The Rise of ‘Alternative’ Development 
Banks, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-the-washington-
consensus-the-rise-of-alternative-development-banks/. 
101 “For many Chinese trade veterans, it is impossible to give up the WTO as China is one 
of the biggest beneficiaries of WTO. They have fought hard to make China join the WTO, 
and it is unthinkable to turn away from it.” XIAOTONGET AL., supra note 67, at 547.   
102 CIURIAK, supra note 81.  
103 Andrew Gamble, Multipolarity and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in THE 
POLITICS OF TRANSATLANTIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TTIP IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 9 
(Jean-Frédéric Morin et al. eds., Ashgate 2015) [hereinafter THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TTIP IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD]. 
104 “If Brazil, India, and China play their assigned roles in this storyline, it may all work out 
peacefully. But that is not the only outcome observed when such tactics were applied 
historically. This is a world that starts to resemble the 19th century Great Powers situation. 
That episode of globalization did not end well.” Richard Baldwin, The Systemic Impact, in 
MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAME-CHANGERS OR COSTLY DISTRACTIONS 
FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM? , supra note 76, at 26.  
105 Id., at 30.  
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structures within the international trading system.’106 Draper and Ismail argue that 
the most likely scenario is a pro-EU decision.107 In any case, any choice will involve 
significant economic and political costs for the LDCs, which could be fatal for 
their development. In a recent paper, Benvenisti convincingly mapped the 
'silencing' effects of the fragmentation of international economic law as 
represented by the TTIP for developing states. 108  While acknowledging this 
prospect, we also want to stress that it is a threat of 'cacophony' for international 
trade law, a cacophony that again will be to the detriment of the LDCs.  
 
VI. BEYOND THE (DEVELOPING) STATE: THE TTIP/TPP/CETA AND 
THE SUBALTERNS  
 
Finally, this article aims to escape ‘state-centric’ conceptions of international (trade) 
law and broaden the scope of inquiry for the TTIP’s/CETA’s/TPP’s affected 
‘outsiders’. 109  More specifically, the potential impact of these trade/investment 
treaties on the subalterns, that is the most oppressed and marginalised groups of 
DCs/LDCs such as poor peasants, unskilled labourers, women and minorities, 
further demonstrates the potentially damaging character of these negotiations.110 
Looking below the ‘veil’ of sovereign statehood and national economy that 
dominates international law and mainstream economics reveals the potential 
breadth of the impact of such mega-markets. Two examples illustrate this point: 
first, how increased competition in agricultural products will not only negatively 
influence national economies in the Global South, but will also specifically hit the 
small farmers harder and enhance the position of (mostly-but not exclusively-
                                               
106 Peter Draper, Salim Ismail, The Potential Impact of Mega-regionals on Sub-Saharan Africa and 
LDCs in the Region, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAME-CHANGERS OR 
COSTLY DISTRACTIONS FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM? , supra note 76, at 31. 
107 Id. 
108 Eyel Benvenisti, Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of Global 
Public Law (Global Trust Working Paper Series, Paper No. 08, 2015).  
109 For the different usages of the term, see Susan Marks, State-Centrism, International Law and 
the Anxieties of Influence, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.  339 (2006).  
110 Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the 
Incommensurability of Difference, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.  337, 361 (1996) (“Edward Said (1988) 
traces the origins of the term subaltern to Antonio Gramsci. In Gramsci’s usage, 
subalternity is the opposite to a dominant, elite or hegemonic position of power, and it is 
the interaction between dominant and subaltern groupings that is the essence of history. 
Subaltern Studies scholars use the notion broadly, as inclusive of all those subordinated in 
South Asian society, whether according to class, gender, caste, religion, age, office or any 
other system of hierarchizing difference into relations of domination and subordination.”). 
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Western) corporations in agriculture.111Second, the impact of the patent provisions 
of these agreements on access to medicine in the Global South and who will bear 
the brunt of these changes when access to essential medicine becomes even more 
difficult. 
 
A. The TTIP and Small Farmers: Lessons from the Bananas Saga 
 
As previously discussed, the possibility of trade diversion due to 
harmonised/mutually recognised standards and even lower tariffs between 
contracting states in agricultural products is substantial. In turn, this shift will annul 
in practice the preferential treatment accorded to the products of certain Global 
South states and will expose their products to increased competition. The 
experience of the WTO and the well-known Bananas cases which involved a claim 
by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the US that the EU’s trade preferences for 
the ACP countries was contrary to the WTO’s rules of non-discrimination, Most-
Favoured Nation, and licensing arrangements, demonstrate that small agricultural 
units will suffer most.112 It is also relevant to the EU’s stance in its negotiations 
around the Cotonou Agreement, as its relationship with the ACP countries under 
that Agreement was central to the cases. Even though Caribbean states were 
directly affected by the outcome of the process, they were recognised as ‘third 
states’ within the WTO process. It is notable that depending upon the specific 
architecture of the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) systems, they will 
probably lose even this (limited) status.  
 
In the context of the Banana saga the crucial difference between these states and 
those in Latin America that brought the case was how bananas production was 
organised. In the first case, bananas were grown in small household plots through 
labour-intensive methods that were relatively environment-friendly and in many 
cases, run by female heads of households.113 Hence, the production of the fruit 
accorded a relatively high and sustainable income to numerous local actors, 
empowered women and was environmentally sustainable. In the second instance, 
banana production in the Latin American states was dominated by the US-based 
                                               
111  For the significance of corporate lobbying in the process of TTIP negotiations, see 
Tereza Novotná, Business Interests and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in THE 
POLITICS OF TRANSATLANTIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TTIP IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD,, 
supra note 92, at  27. 
112  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, 591 (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) 
[hereinafter BANANA CASES]. 
113  Gavin Fridell, The Case against Cheap Bananas: Lessons from the EU-Caribbean Banana 
Agreement, 37 CRITICAL SOC.  285, 288 (2011).  
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company Chiquita, in large plantations, where even unionised workers earned three 
times less and worked longer hours than their counterparts in the Caribbean.114  
 
Therefore, the perceived advantages of trade liberalisation in agriculture must be 
seen in context. One of the principal arguments against preferential treatment of 
imports from the Windward Islands was that it resulted in higher prices for 
bananas in the EU market.115 Nonetheless, these marginally higher prices arguably 
had a minimal impact upon the relatively affluent consumers in the EU, while they 
were crucial for the sustainability of entire communities in the Caribbean. In these 
terms it is incorrect to ‘read’ the Bananas dispute as a competition between 
different states of the Global South for access in the EU market. Rather, the active 
involvement of the US indicates the complicated nature of global value chains in 
trade. These cases also warrant a look beyond sovereign statehood, by rather 
focusing on which domestic actors benefit and lose from further trade 
liberalisation in primary agricultural products. The Bananas cases precedent 
necessitates closer examination of how trade liberalisation and trade diversion 
under the TTIP/TPP/CETA will impact upon the livelihood of the most 
vulnerable social groups of the Global South. In turn, this requires focus on an 
understanding of ‘human development’ that questions the centrality of economic 
growth that still dominates international legal discourse regarding development,116 
a fact also reflected in the justification strategies for the TTIP.117 
                                               
114 Id. 
115  “Under the unified EU [banana] policy, quotas, high prices, and preferential access 
provide aid to preferred suppliers, but cost EU consumers dearly and the quota restrictions 
hurt nonpreferred suppliers (mainly Latin American countries)” Brent Borrell, EU 
Bananarama III, (International Economics Department, The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper, 1994); See BANANA CASES, supra note 100. 
116 “Within international law, modern development discourse both tapped into the logic of 
nationalism being mobilised in the struggles for independence and provided a way to meet 
the challenge that successful struggles posed to European ‘universalism’. It did this through 
the replacement of the old order based on race or civilizational status with a new scale 
secured by the ostensibly ‘scientiﬁc’ measure of Gross National Product (GNP), also 
invented around this time.” PAHUJA, supra note 3, at 37-38.  
117 European Commission, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Economic Analysis 
Explained (September 2013), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf( “According 
to CEPR’s researchers, TTIP will be beneficial not only for the US and the EU but also for 
their trading partners around the world, to the tune of €99 billion. This is because 
economic growth in the US and EU means more purchases by consumers and business of 
other countries’ products. It is also because any common regulatory approaches between 
the EU and the US will reduce costs for exporters from and to those markets – so-called 
positive spillover effects.”). 
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B. Access to Medicines in the Developing World: Eroding ‘TRIPS Flexibilities’?  
 
A second example that demonstrates the impact of mega-markets (and the CETA) 
on the subalterns is the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) provisions and its effect 
on access to affordable medicine.118 Again, the lack of transparency in negotiations 
means that some of the comments are based on leaks and remain speculative until 
the TTIP’s publication. Nonetheless, Chapter 22 of the CETA provides a glimpse 
into some general trends.119 In Article 3 of the CETA, the importance of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is recognised and states 
are encouraged to ensure consistency in the interpretation and application of the 
Chapter with the Declaration.120 Notwithstanding this commitment under Article 
9, Canada agrees to bring its patent protection system in line with the EU’s (Patent 
Term Restoration), which in practice, results in a two-year extension of drug 
patents.121 Moreover, Article 3 remains aspirational, whereas Chapter 22 patent 
rights are accompanied by strong enforcement mechanisms. For example, Canada 
dropped its initial demand to exclude IPR matters from the ISDS mechanism and 
instead the possibility of jointly agreed binding interpretations was incorporated 
under Chapter 10.122 It appears that the TPP provides for similar mechanisms. In 
                                               
118 The issue has also attracted the attention of Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, see Joseph E 
Stiglitz ,Don't Trade Away Our Health, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/opinion/dont-trade-away-our-health.html?_r=1. 
119 See supra note 37 above.   
120 Id. (“1. The Parties recognise the importance of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health adopted on 14 November 2001 by the Ministerial 
Conference of the World Trade Organization. In interpreting and implementing the rights 
and obligations under this Chapter, the Parties shall ensure consistency with this 
Declaration.”). 
121 Scott Sinclair et al. Intellectual Property Rights,  in MAKING SENSE OF CETA: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE FINAL TEXT OF THE CANADA-EUROPEAN UNION COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC 
AND TRADE AGREEMENT 58 (Stuart Trew et al. eds.,Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2014) https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/making-sense-
ceta. 
122  Full text of CETA, see Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development, CETA, (last visited Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/22.aspx?lang=eng 
(“Mindful that investor state dispute settlement tribunals are meant to enforce the 
obligations referred to in Article X.17(1): Scope of a Claim to Arbitration of Chapter x 
(yyy), and are not an appeal mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts, the Parties 
recall that the domestic courts of each Party are responsible for the determination of the 
existence and validity of intellectual property rights. The Parties further recognize that each 
Party shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of 
this Agreement regarding intellectual property within their own legal system and practice. 
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addition to that, there is agreement between the supporters and opponents of the 
TPP that the Agreement will also enable patenting ‘diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans, and animals’. 123  Médecins Sans 
Frontières argue that, ‘[s]uch measures could increase (the) medical liability and costs 
of medical practice, and reduce access to basic medical procedures. Several medical 
associations have declared patenting of medical procedures unethical, and (the) 
U.S. law prohibits enforcement of these patents on medical practitioners.’ 124 
Similarly, Oxfam has also been vocal against the EU’s approach to patents as 
reflected in the FTAs it is currently negotiating.125 The principal concern here is 
that under the pressure of large pharmaceutical corporations,126 the EU and the US 
may attempt to gradually erode ‘TRIPS flexibilities’ that allows for considerable 
exceptions (for example, compulsory licencing) on the grounds of public health for 
which the Global South fought long and hard.127  
                                                                                                                   
The Parties agree to review the relation between intellectual property rights and investment 
disciplines within 3 years after entry into force of the agreement or at the request of a 
Party. Further to this review and to the extent required, the Parties may issue binding 
interpretations to ensure the proper interpretation of the scope of investment protection 
under this Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article X.27: Applicable Law 
and Rules of Interpretation of Chapter x (Investment).”). 
123 Peter Draper & Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, The Trans-Pacific (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)-Key Issues and Potential Impact on Members, in MEGA-
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAME-CHANGERS OR COSTLY DISTRACTIONS FOR THE 
TRADING SYSTEM? , supra note 76, at 14.   
124 Médecins Sans Frontières Briefing Note, Trading away Health: The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) (2013), http://www.msfaccess.org/spotlight-on/trans-pacific-partnership-
agreement. 
125  OXFAM, HAI EUROPE, TRADING AWAY ACCESS TO MEDICINES – REVISITED: HOW 
THE EUROPEAN TRADE AGENDA CONTINUES TO UNDERMINE ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
(2014) https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-trading-
away-access-medicines-290914-en.pdf. [hereinafter OXFAM, TRADING AWAY] 
126 Perhaps the most well-known reaction to compulsory licensing under TRIPS was that of 
the CEO of Bayer, who argued that compulsory licencing of a cancer drug by India was 
‘theft’, see Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollackmarch, India Orders Bayer to License a Patented Drug, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 12,  2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/business/global/india-overrules-bayer-allowing-
generic-drug.html. 
127 'TRIPS flexibilities' are provisions that permit deviation from the intended harmonizing 
minimum standards of IP rights. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 
14 November 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, at 114, ¶5(b), 
WT/MIN(0l)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755  (2002) (“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does 
not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.... [W]e 
reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
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The legitimising narrative for increased IP protection is that these structures 
provide incentives for corporations to invest in research and therefore, it promotes 
innovation,128 albeit evidence which supports this assertion remains limited and 
questionable.129 Second, low average income in developing countries means that 
individuals are unable to pay enough to ‘compensate’ for private investment. In 
turn, this means that pharmaceutical corporations tend to underinvest in research 
linked to endemic diseases outside the Global North. 130  Even when research 
occurs, the resultant prices render them inaccessible to most individuals in the 
Global South. So far, the most effective way of lowering the costs has been the 
production of generic drugs, which are sold in a fraction of the price of the original 
one. This is one of the cases where competition has been proven to drag down 
prices in general, thereby facilitating access to much-needed medication. 
Nonetheless, the production of generics will be impaired if the CETA/TTIP/TPP 
provisions accord higher protection to IPR than those guaranteed in the TRIPS. 
Further, these treaties appear to be a confirmation that the only realistic and 
desirable drive behind pharmaceutical research is/should be profit. Within this 
framework, those areas of research that are not (immediately) profitable are 
neglected. The Ebola outbreak and lack of suitable medicines demonstrate the 
potentially destructive consequences of this approach. 131  Further, the WHO 
                                                                                                                   
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.... [W]e recognize that these 
flexibilities include [compulsory licensing, etc.]”). 
128 See generally Tim Warstall, Where Joe Stiglitz Goes Wrong on Big Pharma and the TPP, FORBES 
(Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/01/31/where-joe-stiglitz-
goes-wrong-on-big-pharma-and-the-tpp/. 
129  HA-JOO CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 144 (Bloomsbury Press 2008). (“Like all other institutions, 
intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights and trademarks) may or may not be 
beneficial, depending on how they are designed and where they are used. The challenge is 
not to decide whether to scrap them altogether or strengthen them to the hilt, but to get 
the balance right between the interests of the IPR- holders and the rest of the society (or 
the rest of the world, if you like).”). 
130 See United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Neglected Diseases: A 
Human Rights Analysis World Health Organization (2007), 
http://www.who.int/tdr/publications/documents/seb_topic6.pdf.  
131 OXFAM, Trading Away, supra note 113, at 8-9. (“The current Ebola crisis in West Africa 
poses fundamental questions about the way in which R&D is financed. While Ebola is a 
highly infectious and lethal virus, its outbreaks happen in Africa. However, pharmaceutical 
companies are not interested in the R&D of medicines or vaccines for markets that will not 
produce high profits. It is only now with the threat of widening spread that companies 
have started or resumed research – mostly funded by public money from the US.”). 
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estimates that 80% of deaths due to non-communicable diseases occur in the 
Lower Middle Income Countries, making access to cheap and safe drugs an 
essential precondition for the livelihood and well-being of billions of individuals.132  
These two examples far from exhaust the potential detrimental impact mega-
markets have upon the subalterns. The CETA/TTIP/TPP incorporate and 
elaborate a particular understanding of economic efficiency that prioritises 
economic growth and profit over other potential measures of development, such 
as access to elementary health care, environmental sustainability, high wages, and 
empowerment of women. Far from romanticising the WTO’s laws (for example, 
the TRIPS), it is argued that certain aspects of the same took account of ‘human 
development’ allowing for deviations from a strict ‘economic’ rationality. 
Therefore, we suggest that in order to fully comprehend the impact of these 
agreements, it is essential to adopt a wider approach that questions the assumption 
of a unified ‘national economy’, which is contingent on ‘equal sovereignty’. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
It is a distinctive characteristic of modern law that it operates based on broad 
categorisations (usually on binary schemes) that obscure rich, complicated and 
often contradictory realities on the ground. This contribution aspired to show how 
the ‘Global South’ is no exception to this rule. There is no unanimity as for the 
criteria and modalities of categorisation across international law, but the inclination 
of constructing hierarchies and incorporating a progress-based conception of 
history is very real. In any case, the Global South, in all its permutations and 
combinations, has finally gained a position in terms of economic, legal, and policy 
development, such that the Global North cannot remain impervious to its wishes. 
The TTIP/TPP/CETA, whilst apparently demonstrating a way forward for the 
Global North which avoids having to directly engage with the Global South, also 
by their nature, lays bare weaknesses within its strategy and suggests that the 
Global North has yet to accept the new reality of a Global South that cannot be 
disregarded. First, by moving away from the WTO, the Global North has ceded its 
ability to control world trade law’s agenda through that institution and has sought 
to denude the negotiating power attained by some from the Global South. Second, 
the lack of transparency suggests that, whilst domestic opposition impacts what the 
negotiators think they can push through, the wider global audience of states must 
be kept in the dark as their reactions cannot be foreseen, albeit some 
commentators appear to think that they will accept whatever will come. Third, and 
probably most significantly, in a sense, this trend  makes the Global North appear 
                                               
132 New WHO Report: Deaths from Non-Communicable Diseases on the Rise, with Developing World 
Hit Hardest, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, (Apr. 27, 2011), 
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2011/ncds_20110427/en/. 
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foolhardy in its attempts to retain its dominance in the global market by creating 
these mega markets now that their own individual (or collective in the EU’s 
position) markets cannot withstand the brunt of the Global South’s economic 
forces.  
 
Of course, this is not to underestimate the potential negative consequences for 
those in the Global South, particularly the LDCs or the DCs which retain their 
hybrid economies. For LDCs, this turn to bilateralism means increased adaptation 
costs and possible disruptions in trade, whilst for the global order, the potential 
resistance of the BRICS to this trend could mean increasing tensions with the 
emergence of competing trading blocks. Second, it is imperative to look beyond 
equal sovereignty and national economy and factor in the impact of these 
agreements on the domestic pattern of production, welfare, and power relations. 
The cases of trade in fruit and access to medicine tried to illustrate how class, 
gender, and race will be crucial factors in deciding who will benefit and who will be 
hurt from certain provisions of these emerging agreements. This projected varying 
impact of the TTIP on the Global South also aptly depicts the multiplicity of 
interests that frame the debate on international trade.  
 
To conclude, there are two broader comments to be made, one on policy and one 
on theoretical levels. First, the focus of our analysis on the Global South aspires to 
initiate a debate on how international lawyers should approach our object. Our 
concern is that in a profoundly interconnected world state consent and formal legal 
obligation are not adequate conceptual tools for capturing the breadth and depth 
of the TTIP’s potential consequences for other actors. In turn, this suggests that 
both international lawyers and other global legal actors can no longer legitimately 
‘hide’ behind formalism, but should reflect on how international economic law can 
contribute to the construction of a fairer international society.  
 
Second, the EU possesses a clear mandate within its treaties to take account of 
development in its policies and negotiations. The EU should use this mandate to 
make a clear statement not only as to the general content of the TTIP, but also, to 
the Global South that the impact of its terms on them will be accounted for. 
Further, with regard to the continued negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement, the 
EU should consider the broader context of its other negotiations and bring these 
to the table; particularly, as the EU has pushed for trade liberalisation to become a 
full part of its negotiations with the ACP countries. To do otherwise, is to 
negotiate in bad faith with partners who are unaware of the full nature of the 
market terms they are legally engaging and attempting to trade within. Whilst it 
remains unlikely that the EU will do this, it ought to be cognisant that there are 
significant consequences in not doing so and although these will vary according to 
the Global South player in question, they are nonetheless considerable. 
